Reprinted  from  The  American  Journal  of  Theology,  Vol.  X,  No.  2,  April,  1906 


THEOLOGY  FROM  THE  STANDPOINT 
OF  FUNCTIONAL  PSYCHOLOGY 


EDWARD  SCRIBNER  AMES 


PRINTED  AT  THE  UNIVERSITY  OF  CHICAGO  PRESS 


THEOLOGY  FROM  THE  STANDPOINT  OF  FUNCTIONAL 
PSYCHOLOGY 


EDWARD  SCRIBNER  AMES 
The  University  of  Chicago 


“Functional  psychology ” is  the  designation  given  to  the  present 
tendency  to  treat  consciousness  from  the  biological  standpoint,  and 
with  particular  reference  to  its  functions  in  the  total  life-process.  1 
It  is  contrasted  more  or  less  sharply  with  “structural  psychology, ” 
which  undertakes  an  analysis  of  mental  life  in  terms  of  its  character- 
istic states  and  forms,  without  specific  reference  to  their  origin  in 
the  needs  of  the  organism,  or  to  their  service  in  determining  its  adap- 
tation to  the  environment.2  The  functional  psychology  is  thoroughly 
evolutionary.  As  Professor  James  puts  it:  “Mind  and  world 
in  short  have  been  evolved  together,  and  in  consequence  are  some- 
thing of  a mutual  fit.  ”3  And  in  the  course  of  this  evolution  mental 
life  has  developed  as  the  chief  instrument  in  the  process  of  adapting 
the  psycho-physical  organism  to  its  physical  and  social  environment. 
Our  minds  are  therefore  practical  affairs,  useful  in  satisfying  the 
^ needs  of  our  nature.  “Mental  life  is  primarily  teleological;  that  is 
to  say  that  our  various  ways  of  feeling  and  thinking  have  grown  to 
be  what  they  are  because  of  their  utility  in  shaping  our  reactions  on 
p*-  the  outer  world.  ”4  Great  importance,  in  this  view,  attaches  to  the 
genesis  of  the  different  forms  of  consciousness,  and  a general  formula 
is  offered  concerning  the  origin  of  consciousness  itself.5  This  placing 
of  consciousness  and  all  its  “states”  in  a larger  life-process  deter- 

1 Angell,  Psychology , pp.  6,  7,  64;  James,  Talks  to  Teachers  on  Psychology , p.  24. 

2 Serviceable  statements  of  the  functional  psychology  will  be  found  in  the  following 
articles:  Angell,  “The  Relations  of  Psychology  to  Philosophy,”  University  of  Chicago 
Decennial  Publications , pp.  5-8;  Dewey, “The  Reflex-Arc  Concept  in  Psychology,  ” Psy- 
chological Review , Vol.  Ill,  pp.  357-70.  For  the  structural  psychology  see  Titchener 
“The  Postulates  of  a Structural  Psychology,”  Philosophical  Review , Vol.  VII  (1898), 
pp.  449-65* 

3 James,  Psychology , Briefer  Course , p.  4. 

4 Ibid.  5 Angell,  Psychology , p.  50. 

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mines  the  functional  psychology  to  the  use  of  dynamic,  rather 
than  static,  conceptions.  It  maintains  that  the  fundamental  charac- 
teristic of  the  organism  is  activity.  In  the  lowest  forms  of  life  there 
are  spontaneity  and  internal  co-ordination  in  the  maintenance  of 
adjustment  to  environment.  The  child,  with  a few  reflexes  and  a 
great  wealth  of  uncontrolled  energy,  is  primarily  a “behaving 
organism,”  as  Professor  James  expresses  it.6  Certain  forms  of  this 
behavior  are  native,  and  others  acquired.  There  is  in  reality  no  mere 
passivity.  In  the  course  of  its  reflex  and  instinctive  movements 
the  organism  is  continually  developing  new  “situations”  and  “prob- 
lems, ” in  reference  to  which  constant  adjustment  is  made.  Abound- 
ing energy,  issuing  in  impulsive  movements,  which  bring  in  return  a 
wealth  of  sense-impressions  through  hands,  eyes,  ears,  and  muscles, 
is  the  original  possession  of  the  child.  These  impressions  lead  in  turn 
to  modifications  in  the  movements;  and  thus  a circuit  of  reactions  is 
maintained.  The  organization  of  his  efforts  in  order  to  make  his 
activity  most  effective,  and  to  attain  the  fullest  satisfaction  of  his 
various  needs,  is  the  one  great  concern,  psychologically  expressed,  of 
the  human  being. 

This  explanation  of  the  different  phases  of  consciousness  with 
reference  to  the  concrete  life- conditions  which  call  them  forth,  and 
with  reference  to  their  service  in  the  ultimate  control  of  those  con- 
ditions is  extended  over  the  whole  scope  of  the  mental  life.  Not  only 
the  mental  activity  of  the  savage  and  of  the  child  has  its  value  as  a 
means  of  furthering  their  welfare,  but  also  the  abstract  thinking  of 
civilized  man  roots  itself  at  last  in  practical  needs,  and  is  estimated 
by  the  degree  to  which  it  serves  them.  The  “truth”  of  science  and 
of  metaphysics  is  tested  at  last  by  the  success  with  which  they  aid  the 
life-processes.  Every  hypothesis  of  science  stands  ready  at  any  mo- 
ment to  submit  to  actual  tests,  and  every  system  of  philosophy  in  the 
last  resort  is  judged  by  the  results  which  follow  from  it.  In  this  way 
functional  psychology  extends  its  claims  over  the  whole  domain  of 
experience  and  philosophy.  The  problems  of  ethics  are  involved  in 
the  psychology  of  desire  and  volition,  and  it  is  only  a matter  of 
convenience  that  the  field  of  ethics  is  separated  from  psychology. 
In  the  same  way  logic  and  aesthetics  are  elaborations  of  the  psy- 

6 James,  Talks  to  Teachers  on  Psychology , chap.  3. 


THEOLOGY  AND  FUNCTIONAL  PSYCHOLOGY 


221 


chology  of  judgment  and  feeling.  Metaphysics  is  granted  a distinct 
field,  in  the  same  provisional  and  practical  way,  only  as  a means 
of  specializing  the  problems  for  convenience  in  treatment.  Any 
thorough  handling  of  the  psychological  problems  of  cognition  takes 
one  straight  into  the  midst  of  metaphysics  without  any  break 
or  leap.  The  philosophical  sciences  are  all,  in  the  words  of  Profes- 
sor Angell,  “organic  developments  of  a common  root  and  represent 
phases,  or  stages,  in  the  solution  of  a single  complex  problem”  — 
“the  problem  of  the  structure  and  function  of  consciousness.” 
Accordingly,  “when  psychological  study  is  interpreted  in  a func- 
tional, as  well  as  a structural,  sense,  the  theoretical  distinctions 
between  psychology  and  philosophy  have  ceased  to  exist.  ”7 

Theology  stands  in  essentially  the  same  relation  to  psychology.  A 
thorough  consideration  of  the  concepts  of  theology,  their  origin,  de- 
velopment, and  significance  for  man’s  life,  requires  a psychological 
study  of  the  religious  consciousness.  On  the  other  hand,  if  one 
starts  with  the  psychology  of  religion,  and  pursues  it  to  the  full  extent, 
it  is  found  to  involve  the  recognition  and  investigation  of  the  ultimate 
problems  of  theology.  Any  demarkation  of  the  spheres  of  the  psy- 
chology of  religion  and  of  theology  is  therefore  just  as  arbitrary,  and 
is  to  be  held  just  as  lightly,  as  that  between  psychology  and  meta- 
physics. If  this  relation  is  not  so  clear  between  psychology  and 
theology  as  it  is  between  psychology  and  other  metaphysical  sciences, 
it  may  be  due  to  the  present  undeveloped  state  of  the  psychology 
of  religion,  and  to  the  tendency  of  theology  to  cultivate  its  field  in 
greater  isolation  from  the  influence  of  the  natural  sciences.8  There 
are  some  results  already  at  hand  which  indicate  in  a general  way  the 
significance  of  functional  psychology  in  the  domain  of  theology. 

This  psychology  has  fruitfully  employed  the  genetic  and  historical 
method,  by  which  developed  forms  of  consciousness  are  investigated 
through  their  earlier  stages,  and,  if  possible,  in  their  very  beginnings. 
Pursuing  this  method,  it  is  pertinent  to  inquire  what  place  was  held 

7 Angell,  “The  Relations  of  Psychology  to  Philosophy,”  Decennial  Publications 
of  the  University  of  Chicago,  Vol.  Ill,  pp.  20,  21. 

8 Of  the  works  in  the  psychology  of  religion  only  Professor  James’s  Varieties  of 
Religious  Experience  indicates  the  import  of  such  studies  for  theology.  Investigations 
in  this  field  have  been  limited  mainly  to  the  gathering  and  classification  of  material  con- 
cerning certain  phases  of  the  religious  history  of  individuals,  particularly  during  the 
period  of  conversion. 


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in  primitive  religions  by  the  intellectual  processes  which,  in  the 
developed  forms  of  religion,  have  given  rise  to  theology. 

The  study  of  the  beginnings  of  the  religious  consciousness  has 
greatly  lessened  the  claims  of  the  intellectualists  as  to  the  character, 
function,  and  importance  of  specific  religious  ideas.  It  is  no  longer 
claimed  by  the  best  authorities  that  all  peoples  possess  a definite  idea 
of  God.  Many  primitive  forms  of  religion,  and  others  which  have 
reached  a high  state  of  development,  are  quite  without  the  concep- 
tion of  a personal  deity.  The  Blackfellows  of  Australia,9  for  instance, 
do  not  get  beyond  spirit  ancestors  and  other  spirit  individuals.  Even 
these  are  involved  in  their  explanation  of  practical  needs.  The  ab- 
sorbing interest  with  these  races  is  the  immediately  practical  and 
social  character  of  their  ceremonies  and  activities.  The  mainsprings 
of  these  ceremonies  are  the  elemental  life-interests — birth,  youth, 
marriage,  food,  war,  death.  For  instance,  among  the  Malays  of 
Malacca  there  are  elaborate  ceremonies  accompanying  the  planting 
and  harvesting  of  rice,  hunting,  fishing,  and  mining.  The  object  is 
to  make  sure  the  results  of  such  activities.  In  the  totemism  of  the 
tribes  of  central  Australia,  where  each  group  of  people  identifies  its 
life  and-  welfare  with  those  of  a certain  class  of  animals  or  plants, 
the  purpose  of  the  ceremonies  is  to  increase  the  number  of  the  totemic 
animals  or  plants;  and  often  this  means  provision  for  the  food  sup- 
ply; but  their  performance  of  ceremony  is  not  associated  in  the 
native  mind  with  the  idea  of  appealing  to  the  assistance  of  any 
supernatural  being.10  The  conception  of  “spirits”  and  of  the 
supernatural,  where  it  does  arise,  is  therefore  not  fundamental  in 
the  development  of  religion,  but  is  rather  secondary  and  incidental.11 
“Mere  animism  can  hardly  be  called  primitive  religion  more  than 
primitive  science.  It  is  simply  a postulate  from  which  to  explain 
things,  a principle  of  which  one  may  take  advantage  in  many 
practical  problems.”12 

Further  evidence  that  an  exaggerated  importance  has  been  at- 
tached to  reflection  and  conscious  control  of  religious  activities  is 

9 Spencer  and  Gillen,  The  Native  Tribes  of  Central  Australia , p.  207. 

10  Ibid.,  p.  170. 

11  Irving  King,  The  Differentiation  of  the  Religious  Consciousness,  p.  28. 

13  Ibid.,  pp.  28,  38,  48;  cf.  Brinton,  Religion  of  Primitive  Peoples,  p.  84. 


THEOLOGY  AND  FUNCTIONAL  PSYCHOLOGY 


223 


found  in  the  domination  of  imitation  and  custom.  The  force  of  social 
habits  is  tyrannical  in  the  extreme,  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  they  are 
often  due  to  the  most  trivial,  accidental  causes.  Among  the  Malays 
“another  tribe  on  undertaking  to  mine  tin  would  imitate  every 
detail  in  the  method  of  those  who  first  did  it,  even  to  such  irrelevant 
details  as  those  of  language  and  dress.”13  It  is  the  old  fallacy  of 
post  hoc  ergo  propter  hoc , and  is  due  not  so  much  to  incorrect  think- 
ing as  to  the  influence  of  unreflective  imitation.  How  far  these 
customs  are  from  being  the  expression  of  definite  ideas  is  shown  in 
the  explanations  given  of  them.  Among  the  Australians  the  reason 
for  performing  the  ceremonies  as  they  do  is  that  their  ancestors  did 
so.  If  any  further  explanations  are  sought,  the  inquiry  appears  to 
the  natives  ridiculous  and  incomprehensible.14 

The  priority  of  practical,  social  activities,  and  the  secondary  char- 
acter of  the  ideas  which  later  arise  in  explanation  of  them,  are  well 
illustrated  in  the  field  of  aesthetics.  “The  dance  before  the  chase  or 
battle,  the  mimes  at  agricultural  festivals  or  at  initiation  ceremonies, 
which  seem  to  the  uninstructed  onlooker  crude  forms  of  art,  are  to 
the  minds  of  the  actors  entirely  serious.  They  give  success  in  the 
real  activities  which  follow  these  symbolic  acts.  They  bring  the  rain 
or  sunshine  or  returning  spring.”15  Art  is  here  the  state  or  atti- 
tude of  consciousness  which  is  built  up  in  these  activities,  and  which 
results  from  them.  This  state  may  eventually  be  cultivated  on  its 
own  account,  and  may  be  employed  as  a test  of  the  artistic  character 
of  other  activities;  but  the  view  that  the  dances  or  ceremonies  arose 
in  the  first  instance  in  order  to  give  expression  to  the  already  existing 
art-consciousness,  or  art- ideas,  is  discarded.  “Art  has  not  arisen 
primarily  to  satisfy  an  already  existing  love  of  beauty.  It  has  arisen 
chiefly,  if  not  wholly,  from  other  springs,  and  has  itself  created  the 
sense  by  which  it  is  enjoyed.”  16  In  the  same  way  it  may  be  said 
that  the  religious  consciousness  is  built  up  in  the  course  of  certain 
activities  performed  by  the  social  group  with  reference  to  needs  which 
are  often  of  a very  material  kind.  Gradually  this  attitude  is  de- 

*3  King,  op.  cit.,  p.  n. 

*4  Spencer  and  Gillen,  The  Native  Tribes  oj  Central  Australia , pp.  136  f. 

*5  J.  H.  Tufts,  “On  the  Genesis  of  the.  ^sthetie  Categories,”  The  University  of 
Chicago  Decennial  Publications , Vol.  Ill,  Part  2,  p.  8. 

16  Ibid.,  p 5. 


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THE  AMERICAN  JOURNAL  OF  THEOLOGY 


tached  from  the  setting  in  which  it  arose,  and  becomes  in  turn  a stan- 
dard and  test  by  which  to  determine  whether  other  given  experi- 
ences are  religious  or  have  religious  value.  This  agrees  also  with 
the  increasing  evidence  of  the  priority  of  ritual  over  moral  or  theoreti- 
cal teaching.17 

Direct  confirmation  of  the  source  and  character  of  the  first  stages 
of  the  religious  consciousness  is  found  in  the  experience  of  the  child. 
His  interest  in  religion  is  chiefly  concerned  with  its  forms  and  cere- 
monies. He  is  little  interested  in  the  meaning  which  older  persons 
attach  to  them,  and  he  participates  in  them  either  in  the  imitative  spirit 
or  with  reference  to  the  securing  of  his  personal  ends.  His  prayers 
are  for  the  most  part  repetitions  of  words  with  scrupulous  regard  for 
the  precise  order  in  which  they  have  been  learned;  or,  where  they  are 
spontaneous,  usually  express  petitions  for  the  objects  which  he  most 
craves.  It  is  only  in  late  adolescence  that  there  comes  to  conscious- 
ness any  deep  questioning  concerning  the  meaning  and  value  of  the 
religious  exercises.  And  even  then  it  is  only  in  exceptional  cases  ex- 
tended beyond  the  conventional,  and  it  may  be  rather  simple,  forms 
of  thought  in  the  social  group  of  which  he  is  a part.18 

The  functional  treatment  of  developed  theological  conceptions 
keeps  in  view  their  genesis  and  growth  in  actual  experience,  and  tests 
their  truth  and  value  in  terms  of  the  control  and  guidance  of  con- 
duct. Conceptions  are  shorthand  symbols  for  summarizing  and 
unifying  experience.  They  involve  images,  sensuous  and  detailed,  or 
schematic  and  symbolic.  There  is  always  imagery  in  the  most  abstract 
concept.  The  distinguishing  feature  of  the  conception,  however, 
is  the  element  of  meaning,  the  expression  of  relations.  Both  con- 
stituents are  subject  to  change.  The  images  may  be  now  visual, 
now  auditory  or  again  motor;  and  the  meaning  may  gradually 
become  larger,  finer,  and  more  ideal.  This  growth  of  conceptions  is 
dependent  upon  experience,  for  they  are  at  last  just  the  registrations 
of  experience.  Every  different  use  of  an  object  involves  a new  mode 
of  conceiving  it.  “There  is  no  property  absolutely  essential  to  any 
one  thing.”19 

x7  Henry  Preserved  Smith,  Old  Testament  History,  p.  68;  William  Robertson 
Smith,  Religion  of  the  Semites,  pp.  16,  20. 

l8Starbuck,  The  Psychology  of  Religion,  chap.  15,  especially  p.  194. 

J9  James,  Psychology , Vol.  II,  p.  333. 


THEOLOGY  AND  FUNCTIONAL  PSYCHOLOGY 


225 


The  significance  of  this  psychology  of  conception  for  all  theologi- 
cal ideas  may  be  illustrated  in  terms  of  the  most  fundamental  and 
central  conception,  the  conception  of  God.  This  idea  is  not  innate. 
It  arises  with  the  power  of  generalizing  and  unifying  experience,  and 
under  the  practical  demand  for  such  generalization,  in  the  mainte- 
nance and  furtherance  of  practical  interests.  When  the  idea  does  ap- 
pear it  bears  the  impress  of  the  social  and  material  conditions  of  the 
community  which  formulates  it,  and  with  the  growth  of  society  the 
conception  changes  both  as  to  its  imagery  and  its  meaning.  Among 
the  early  Semites,  for  example,  the  thought  of  the  deities  was  evidently 
determined  by  the  natural  conditions  under  which  the  people  lived. 
Living  water,  whether  from  springs  or  running  streams,  formed  the 
basis  for  community  life  by  creating  vegetation  for  food  and  trees 
for  shelter.  On  this  account  the  springs  and  rivers  were  sacred. 
The  water  was  itself  the  deity  or  his  abode.  The  land  which  it  fer- 
tilized was  holy  ground,  clearly  distinguished  by  the  growth  of  vege- 
tation, and  all  things  within  the  sacred  precincts  were  guarded  by 
tabus.  When  life  was  nomadic,  and  herds  and  flocks  were  the  chief 
forms  of  wealth,  the  gods  were  often  conceived  as  animals,  such  as 
the  sacred  bull  or  goat.  When  agriculture  was  cultivated,  the  natural 
elements  which  conditioned  the  growth  of  harvests  determined  the 
idea  of  the  deities. 

The  growth  of  the  idea  of  God  reflects  also  the  development  of 
the  social  organization.  Each  tribe  or  social  group  had  its  own  gods, 
expressing,  and  in  turn  strengthening,  certain  characteristic  phases 
of  its  life.  As  the  tribes  enlarged  and  took  on  new  activities,  the  dei- 
ties evidenced  corresponding  growth.  On  the  other  hand,  if  a tribe 
was  exterminated,  or  lost  its  identity,  its  god  reverted  to  the  lower 
condition  of  demons,  whose  chief  characteristic  was  that  they  were 
without  worshipers.  The  success  of  a particular  group  in  conquest 
meant  the  subjugation  of  the  conquered  gods,  and  finally  their 
extinction.  Yahweh  was  originally  the  god  of  a single  Semitic  tribe. 
He  gained  power  and  significance  with  the  leadership  and  conquest 
which  his  subjects  were  able  to  accomplish,  so  that  in  the  end,  with  the 
organization  of  the  nation,  the  ancient  name  of  the  deity  was  retained 
for  the  God  of  the  whole  people.  This  correspondence  between  the 
stage  of  social  development  and  the  nature  of  the  gods  is  still  further 


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illustrated  by  the  significant  fact  that,  when  the  mother  was  the 
head  of  the  family,  the  deities  were  goddesses.20  Later,  when  the 
father  became  the  recognized  head  of  the  family,  the  deity  became 
masculine,  and  took  on  the  attributes  and  characteristics  of  paternal 
authority.  Among  the  Hebrews,  to  whom  has  been  ascribed  an  ethical 
monotheism  derived  in  a unique,  supernatural  way,  the  develop- 
ment of  monotheism  was  coincident  with,  and  apparently  dependent 
upon,  the  rise  of  the  monarchy.  The  coalescence  of  smaller  social 
groups  into  larger  unities  was  reflected  in  the  fusion  of  the  gods  them- 
selves, until,  in  the  attainment  of  the  kingdom  centering  in  the  person 
of  the  king,  the  basis  was  laid  for  the  idea  of  one  God,  which  obvi- 
ously was  closely  fashioned,  though  in  heroic  proportions,  upon  the 
model  afforded  by  the  earthly  monarch.  The  heavenly  king,  like 
the  earthly,  gradually  developed  a court  with  angelic  messengers  and 
numerous  cohorts  ready  at  command  to  execute  the  sovereign  will.  An- 
other stage  was  reached  for  the  Hebrews  during  the  exile.  That  great 
strain  upon  their  social  institutions  and  the  enforced  removal  of 
many  people  from  Jehovah’s  land  magnified  their  sense  of  his  dis- 
tance from  them  and  emphasized  the  idea  of  his  transcendence. 
To  the  sensitive  minds  of  the  great  prophets  the  contact  with  other 
peoples  gave  rise  also  to  the  conception  of  Jehovah  as  the  God  of  all 
nations,  though  this  idea  was  evidently  born  of  patriotism  and  hope 
rather  than  of  actual  political  supremacy.  This  feeling  of  the  great- 
ness and  the  transcendence  of  Jehovah,  in  connection  with  their 
national  distress,  resulted  with  the  Hebrews,  as  it  has  with  other  peo- 
ples, in  the  need  of  mediation  and  in  the  hope  of  a savior.  Their 
Messiah,  under  the  stress  of  the  national  humiliation,  took  the  form  of 
a suffering  servant.  It  is  an  impressive  fact  that  the  two  typical  Jew- 
ish conceptions  of  the  redemptive  work  of  Jehovah  were  the  counter- 
parts of  two  contrasted  periods  of  the  national  life.  One  was  pro- 
jected from  the  background  of  the  golden  age  of  the  monarchy  under 
King  David.  As  he  put  to  silence  his  enemies  and  established  a 
glorious  kingdom,  so  God  would  some  day,  by  another  mighty  one, 
deliver  his  people  and  make  them  supreme.  The  other  view  of 
divine  deliverance  was  an  expression  of  the  humbled  and  chastened 
national  spirit  in  the  period  of  oppression  and  exile.  Humility  and 

30  W.  Robertson  Smith,  The  Religion  of  the  Semites , pp.  58  ff. 


THEOLOGY  AND  FUNCTIONAL  PSYCHOLOGY 


227 


suffering  innocence  were  its  central  elements.  In  the  end,  when 
his  life  was  completed,  the  character  and  work  of  Jesus  conformed 
best  to  the  latter  type,  while  his  own  experience  and  powerful  person- 
ality added  vividness  and  strength  to  the  ethical,  social  conception 
of  God  as  a loving  Father. 

In  the  same  way  the  thought  of  God  has  been  various  and  changing 
as  it  reflected  the  life  of  different  peoples.  The  temper,  culture,  and 
social  customs  of  the  Greek,  Roman,  and  Teutonic  peoples  have 
reacted  vitally  upon  the  Christian  conception  of  God.  The  process 
still  continues.  The  idea  of  God  is  now  undergoing  perhaps  the  pro- 
foundest  transformation  in  history.  The  forces  accomplishing  it 
are  not  vagaries  of  speculative  philosophy,  but  the  tremendous 
influences  of  modern  civilization.  The  change  is  from  the  tran- 
scendence to  the  immanence  of  God.  It  is  due  to  the  rise  of  democratic 
institutions  and  the  birth  of  an  intense  social  consciousness.  The  old 
notion  of  transcendence  was  the  reflection  of  the  monarchical  form 
of  government  which  has  prevailed  in  all  the  great  nations  from 
antiquity  to  the  modern  era.  The  king  or  emperor  was  far  above 
the  people.  He  was  surrounded  by  vast  estates,  by  castle  walls, 
and  by  large  armies.  He  could  be  approached  only  through  medi- 
ators and  subordinates.  His  arbitrary  will  was  law.  His  ways 
were  full  of  secrecy  and  mystery.  The  corresponding  characteris- 
tics of  his  subjects  were  implicit  faith,  unquestioning  obedience. 
They  sang  his  praises,  and  most  humbly  offered  before  him  their 
gratitude  and  petitions.  Could  anything  describe  more  exactly  than 
such  terms  the  conception  of  a transcendent  God,  and  the  relations 
men  sustain  to  him  ? On  the  other  hand,  nothing  could  be  farther 
from  the  spirit  of  democracy.  In  a democracy  the  chief  concern 
with  reference  to  the  leader  or  ruler  is  not  his  lineage  or  inheritance, 
but  his  own  personality  and  efficiency.  His  will  is  not  arbitrary, 
but  justifies  itself  in  experience,  and  is  held  to  the  standard  of  law 
and  consistency.  The  citizens  feel  themselves  one  with  their  leader. 
They  share  in  the  exercise  of  sovereignty,  and  in  its  responsibilities  and 
dignity.  The  inmost  reality  and  significance  of  the  state  is  found 
in  the  individual  citizens.  They  are  mutually  dependent,  interrelated, 
and  conditioned.  In  such  a society  the  old  conception  of  a tran- 
scendent God  is  out  of  place,  just  as  much  as  is  the  idea  of  an  auto- 


228 


THE  AMERICAN  JOURNAL  OF  THEOLOGY 


cratic,  arbitrary  monarch.  The  great  awakening  of  the  masses  of 
men  in  all  nations  to  self-government  through  the  exercise  of  intel- 
ligent self-control;  the  emancipation  of  slaves;  the  elevation  of  women; 
the  humane  care  of  the  dependent,  defective,  and  criminal  mem- 
bers of  society;  the  great  constructive  organizations  of  labor;  efforts 
toward  the  purification  of  politics ; popular  education ; various  world’s 
congresses  for  the  promotion  of  science,  art,  and  religion — all  these 
are  the  expressions  of  a growing  social  consciousness,  stronger,  more 
enlightened,  and  more  determined  than  mankind  has  ever  before 
experienced,  and  they  are  also  the  causes  and  the  justification  of  the 
conception  of  the  immanence  of  God. 

Such  a statement  of  the  evolution  of  the  conception  of  God  in- 
volves also  the  question  of  the  truth  and  validity  of  that  concep- 
tion. Here  the  relation  in  which  the  functional  psychology  conceives 
itself  to  stand  to  metaphysics  has  the  utmost  importance.  In  this 
psychology  the  statement  of  the  genesis  and  development  of  an  idea 
carries  its  own  indication  of  the  truth  or  reality  of  the  idea.  The 
historical  survey  reveals  the  function  of  the  idea  and  its  value  in 
experience.  In  so  far  as  it  aids  and  furthers  experience,  it  is  true. 
It  is  always  relative,  always  conditioned.  But  just  on  this  account  is 
it  real.  Psychology  does  not  then  merely  lead  up  to  the  boundary 
of  metaphysics,  at  which  point  it  is  compelled  to  transfer  its  problem 
to  a different  kind  of  inquiry.  Metaphysics  is  only  the  more  detailed 
and  persistent  investigation  of  the  psychology  of  conception.  The 
theological  problem  is  therefore  radically  changed.  The  question 
heretofore,  from  the  standpoint  of  transcendence,  has  been:  Does 
a supreme,  absolutely  perfect  being  exist  ? Is  there  an  actual, 
objective  reality  corresponding  to  the  subjective  idea  of  God  ? No 
one  has  ever  been  able  to  produce  any  adequate  answer  to  that 
question. 

The  question  itself  has  fallen  under  suspicion.  There  is  no 
criterion  by  which  it  can  be  judged.  It  is  impossible  to  get  outside 
of  experience  to  investigate  the  assertion  that  something  exists  there. 
The  attempts  to  do  this,  and  the  dogmatic  insistence  upon  “faith”  in 
such  a transcendent  existence,  have  been  the  most  fruitful  sources  of 
skepticism.  The  implications  of  present  knowledge  may  point  to 
further  related  experience,  but  it  is  difficult  to  realize  how  they  could 


THEOLOGY  AND  FUNCTIONAL  PSYCHOLOGY 


229 


prove  the  existence,  truth,  or  objective  reality  of  anything  beyond 
experience.  The  alleged  “proofs  ” of  the  being  of  God  give  the  im- 
pression of  purely  formal,  abstract  circles  of  reasoning.  They  were 
given  up  long  ago  by  Kant  on  the  ground  of  the  impotence  and 
futility  of  such  “pure  reason.”  He  boldly  declared  the  idea  of  God 
to  be  a “regulative”  conception,  justified/ by  the  practical  way  in 
which  it  served  to  unify  and  guide  experience. 

This  did  not  mean  for  Kant,  and  it  does  not  mean  for  modern 
pragmatism,  that  the  idea  of  God  is  false  and  meaningless.  It  does 
involve,  however,  a different  conception  and  criterion  of  “ truth.  ” In 
functional  terms  truth  means  value.  The  question,  Is  the  idea  of  God 
true  ? means : Is  the  idea  of  God  of  value  in  actual  experience  ? Does 
it  serve  to  organize  the  highest  interests  of  life,  and  to  vitalize  them 
with  dynamic  power  in  eliciting  and  controlling  efficient  reactions  of 
the  will  ? If  the  idea  of  God  has  these  values  and  performs  these 
functions,  it  is  true.  Without  these,  it  is  irrelevant  and  untrue.  By 
the  same  criterion,  that  conception  of  God  is  truest  which  aids  most 
in  guiding,  ennobling,  comforting,  and  strengthening  man  in  his 
devotion  to  moral  ends.  The  idea  of  God  in  this  view  becomes  the 
great  “working  hypothesis”  of  religion.  It  corresponds  precisely 
to  the  hypothesis  of  natural  science.  It  guides  activity  and  is  pro- 
gressively modified  by  the  results.  That  eminent  pragmatist,  Profes- 
sor William  James,  in  his  Varieties  0}  Religious  Experience  has 
graphically  described  the  process  in  these  words21 : 

The  deity  to  whom  the  prophets,  seers,  and  devotees  who  founded  the  parti- 
cular cult  bore  witness,  was  worth  something  to  them  personally.  They  could 
use  him.  He  guided  their  imagination,  warranted  their  hopes,  and  controlled 
their  will ; or  else  they  required  him,  as  a safeguard  against  the  demon  and  a 
curber  of  other  people’s  crimes.  In  any  case  they  chose  him  for  the  value  of 
the  fruits  he  seemed  to  them  to  yield.  So  soon  as  the  fruits  began  to  seem  quite 
worthless;  so  soon  as  they  conflicted  with  indispensable  human  ideals,  or 
thwarted  too  extensively  other  values;  so  soon  as  they  appeared  childish,  con- 
temptible, or  immoral  when  reflected  on,  the  deity  grew  discredited,  and  was 
ere  long  neglected  and  forgotten.  When  we  cease  to  admire  or  approve  what 
the  definition  of  a deity  implies,  we  end  by  deeming  that  deity  incredible.22 

21  James,  Varieties  of  Religious  Experience,  p.  29. 

22  In  an  article  entitled  “The  Pragmatic  Interpretation  of  the  Christian  Dogma,” 
by  Irving  King,  in  the  Monist , Vol.  XV,  pp.  248-61,  the  functional  psychology  is  applied 
to  the  conception  of  the  Holy  Spirit,  the  Son  of  God,  the  second  coming  of  Christ,  and 
the  inspiration  of  Scripture.  He  says:  “Our  concepts  are  only  functionally  valid 
and  do  not  refer  to  ontological  realities.  All  our  realities  are  of  the  functional  variety.  ” 


230 


THE  AMERICAN  JOURNAL  OF  THEOLOGY 


So  far  from  being  incompatible  with  Christianity,  such  a view 
finds  many  confirmations  in  the  teaching  of  Jesus.  He  taught  that 
what  one  is  and  does  determines  the  truth  for  him.  The  pure  in 
heart  see  God.  Those  who  hunger  and  thirst  after  righteousness 
attain  the  great  satisfactions  and  insights  of  religion.  He  who  “wills 
to  do”  is  able  to  know.  The  summons  of  Jesus  was  to  service — 
to  a way  of  living.  He  himself  was  the  example  of  religious  faith, 
not  because  of  his  demonstration  of  the  existence  of  a God,  but  be- 
cause in  the  unfolding  of  his  will  there  appeared  the  fullest  exhibition 
of  the  meaning  and  power  of  his  conception  of  God. 

The  same  principles  may  be  applied  to  all  other  theological  con- 
ceptions. The  place  and  function  of  various  ideas  are  instruc- 
tively presented  in  the  history  of  Protestant  denominations.  Here 
religion  confronts  the  individual  in  the  form  of  certain  doctrines. 
The  prominence  of  creeds  and  the  refinements  of  religious  controver- 
sies have  given  religious  bodies  the  appearance  of  being  primarily 
intellectual  movements.  But  it  is  becoming  clear  that  such  bodies 
took  their  rise  in  great  practical  issues,  in  support  and  defense  of 
which  they  elaborated  special  theological  systems.  The  creeds  have 
been  results  rather  than  causes,  and  have  come  to  their  final  for- 
mulation only  when  the  circumstances  out  of  which  they  sprang  have 
become  quiescent,  and  when  the  habits  of  the  social  group  were  be- 
coming fixed  and  rigid.  The  great  causes  which  produced  the  Ref- 
ormation were  moral,  social,  political,  and  commercial.  The  prac- 
tical motives  in  Luther’s  work  are  well  recognized.  In  the  same 
way  every  reformer  was  possessed  by  some  great  humanitarian  pur- 
pose. With  Calvin  it  was  the  freeing  and  elevating  of  the  individ- 
ual. His  efforts  to  emphasize. the  dignity  and  worth  of  man  led 
him  to  exalt  the  principles  of  man’s  immediate  relationship  to  God. 
It  is  God,  and  not  the  church,  who  orders  the  life  of  man.  Hence 
no  church  or  state  has  the  right  to  assume  to  mediate  between  them. 
This  spirit  of  independence  has  worked  itself  out  in  various  forms — 
in  congregational  polity,  and  in  political  freedom  advocated  by  many 
religious  societies.  The  practical  impulse  is  still  more  prominent 
in  such  bodies  as  the  Methodist,  the  Salvation  Army,  and  Christian 
Science. 

In  all  communions  changes  in  statements  of  doctrines  are  gradu- 


THEOLOGY  AND  FUNCTIONAL  PSYCHOLOGY 


23J 


ally  forced  by  the  development  of  social  conditions  and  the  progress  of 
culture.  Within  the  short  time  since  his  day,  the  theological  views 
of  Jonathan  Edwards  have  been  outgrown  by  the  devout  New  Eng- 
landers themselves.  Even  when,  as  in  the  early  stages  of  a denom- 
ination, the  problems  are  most  acute,  it  is  doubtful  whether  the  in- 
tellectual views  are  conspicuous  in  the  minds  of  many  besides  the 
clergy  and  a few  official  leaders.23  The  masses  of  every  communion 
are  held  to  it  primarily  by  the  practical  values  of  religious  living 
and  by  family  traditions,  social  influence,  and  force  of  habit.  Even 
doctrinal  statements  often  have  more  practical  than  intellectual 
significance.  For  instance,  the  confession  in  terms  of  the  creed 
may  be  as  much  an  act  of  worship,  or  an  emotional  reaction,  as 
an  exercise  of  reason.  These  forms  of  worship  and  ordinances  are 
also  subject  to  social  and  cultural  changes.  They  must  be  sub- 
mitted to  the  final  test  of  their  influence  and  fruitfulness  in  the  lives 
of  those  who  employ  them.  If  they  further  and  enrich  the  spiritual 
nature,  they  establish  themselves  with  increasing  spontaneity,  and 
their  value  is  continually  self-evidencing.  But  if  they  are  maintained 
only  by  an  appeal  to  authority,  or  to  the  precedent  of  earlier  and  very 
different  religious  experiences,  then  they  show  themselves  in  the 
process  of  becoming  mere  survivals  and  vestiges  of  past  conditions. 

The  acceptance  of  the  functional  psychology  means,  then,  for  re- 
ligion the  recognition  and  justification  of  the  gradual  and  continuous 
modifications  of  doctrines.  It  does  not  mean  that  these  doctrines 
are  inherently  false,  illusory,  or  useless.24  Heretofore  doctrinal 
changes  have  gone  on  either  unconsciously,  and  therefore  in  a ran- 
dom way,  or  they  have  been  opposed  by  the  established  habits  of 

2 3 James  H.  Lueba,  American  Journal  of  Religious  Psychology  and  Education , 
Vol.  I,  p.  162. 

*4  Neither  does  it  mean  that  religious  knowledge  is  to  be  sought  through  some 
unique  experience.  The  suggestion  of  Professor  James,  Varieties  0}  Religious  Experi- 
ence, p.  431,  elaborated  by  Professor  Starbuck,  in  support  of  the  view  that  the  feelings 
may  furnish  an  avenue  of  religious  knowledge,  has  not  commended  itself  to  many 
scholars.  For  instance,  F.  M.  Davenport,  in  the  discussion  of  the  passional  and 
rational  in  religion,  says:  “I  would  take  straightforward  issue  with  those  who  still 
hold  that  the  subconscious,  the  imperfectly  rational,  the  mystically  emotional  in  spite 
of  all  its  vagaries,  is  par  excellence  the  channel  of  the  inflow  of  divine  life”  ( Primitive 
Traits  in  Religious  Revivals , p.  279).  E.  D.  Starbuck,  "The  Feelings  and  Their 
Place  in  Religion,”  American  Journal  of  Religious  Psychology  and  Education , Vol.  I, 
pp.  168  f. 


232  THE  AMERICAN  JOURNAL  OF  THEOLOGY 

thought  known  as  orthodoxy,  often  in  blind  prejudice  and  with  tragic 
results.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  changes  in  theology  were  understood 
to  be  the  marks  of  growing  religious  life  and  real  aids  in  such  growth, 
theology  would  come  to  take  its  place  among  the  sciences.  It  would 
in  that  case  surrender  its  claim  to  any  unique  authority,  but  it  would 
gain  the  dignity  and  the  working  authority  which  the  natural  sciences 
now  possess.  These  sciences  do  not  claim  any  infallible  knowledge 
or  methods.  Their  conclusions  have  no  finality.  They  are  always 
subject  to  revision,  and  yet  they  are  respected  and  employed  in  affairs 
of  the  greatest  moment.  Moreover  these  sciences  possess  the  funda- 
mentally important  dispositions  of  inquiry,  of  investigation.  Nothing 
is  exempt  from  questioning.  Doubt  is  in  a true  sense  the  instru- 
ment of  scientific  progress.  But  theology  has  labored  under  the  as- 
sumption of  infallible  elements  or  sources,  and  therefore,  at  certain 
points,  has  felt  compelled  to  raise  the  red  flag  against  any  critical 
inquiry.  Nothing  more  characteristically  indicates  the  difference 
between  theology  and  science  than  the  way  in  which  the  one  has 
feared,  and  the  other  favored,  free  investigation.  The  psychology 
of  religion  bids  fair  to  point  the  way  to  a less  pretentious,  but  really 
greater,  service  to  religion  than  theology  has  ever  before  been  able  to 
perform.  Working  in  the  spirit  and  with  the  methods  of  modern 
science,  recognizing  the  tentative  nature  of  its  principles,  and  setting 
itself  patiently  but  bravely  to  practical  experiments,  religion  may  yet 
hope  to  enter  upon  more  secure  and  substantial  progress,  just  as 
education  and  other  forms  of  social  activity  have  done. 


J 


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